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ARTICLES
THE CHANGING REGULATORY TERRAIN OF
CABLE TELEVISION
R. Clark Wadlow*
and Linda M. Wellstein**
Recent legislation, judicial decisions, and administrative actions are creat-
ing and shaping a new era of cable television regulation. The Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act of 19841 (Cable Act) was enacted October 30, 1984, as a
comprehensive amendment to the Communications Act of 1934.2 Effective
December 29, 1984, the Cable Act established a national regulatory policy
for cable television. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
initiated several rulemaking proceedings to adopt regulations interpreting
and implementing this new law.
The judiciary also has played an active role in reshaping cable policy. On
July 19, 1985, the twenty-year-old FCC "must carry" rules3 were declared
unconstitutional by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,4 and Turner Broadcast-
ing System v. FCC.5 Those rules, which required cable operators to carry all
local broadcast signals as part of their basic cable service, were held to vio-
late the first amendment rights of cable operators and programmers.6
On November 12, 1985, the United States Supreme Court granted review
* Partner, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Washington, D.C., specializing in com-
munications law. Adjunct Professor, Institute for Communications Law Studies, Columbus
School of Law, Catholic University of America. Course: "The New Communications Tech-
nologies and the Law." A.B. 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1971, Harvard University.
** Associate, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Washington, D.C., specializing in com-
munications law. B.A. 1979, Marquette University; J.D. 1983, Georgetown University.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559
(West Supp. 1985)) [hereinafter cited as Cable Act]. The Cable Communictions Policy Act of
1984 is contained in title 6 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The Communi-
cations Act of 1934 is codified in scattered sections of the United States Code.
2. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-611 (West Supp. 1985).
3. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-.71 (1984).
4. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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to hear arguments on appeal from the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles.7 The Ninth Circuit had ruled that, under the first amendment,
a city had no right to limit the number of competing cable systems serving
the same area. The long standing practice by which each community
granted one cable company an exclusive cable television franchise to serve
that community is thus now under challenge.
Cable operators recently have petitioned the FCC to preempt certain state
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) regulations alleging that the impact of
those regulations has been to freeze the development of cable television
nonvideo services. The FCC recently voted to preempt certain Nebraska
state regulations because they prevented a cable company from competing
with telephone companies for intrastate and interstate nonvideo business.'
This article will review the Cable Act and the recent judicial and adminis-
trative decisions that are reshaping cable regulatory policy and which will so
profoundly influence the future development of cable television.
I. CABLE TELEVISION AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. Development of Federal Jurisdiction over Cable Television
The FCC began asserting regulatory jurisdiction over cable operators in
the mid-1960's.9 Initially, the FCC regulated the cable industry by estab-
lishing rules for cable systems receiving broadcast signals from microwave
service. ° Shortly thereafter, the FCC concluded that the Communications
7. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
8. See Memorandum Opinion, Declaratory Ruling and Order (In re Cox Cable Commu-
nications, Inc., Commline, Inc., and Cox DTS, Inc.), FCC 85-455, File No. CCB-DFD-83-1,
released Sept. 5, 1985 (Declaratory Ruling and Order); 50 Fed. Reg. 37,426 (1985).
9. Originally, the FCC declined to assert jurisdiction to regulate the emerging cable in-
dustry in the absence of express statutory authority. The Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (currently at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982)), did not address FCC
jurisdiction over cable television because the legislation was drafted long before the first cable
system began operation. See In re Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems,
TV Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of
Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-28 (1959) (FCC declined to assert jurisdiction
over cable entities as broadcasters because cable signals transmitted by wire, not airwaves);
Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 256 (1958) (FCC declined to assert juris-
diction over cable operators as common carriers because cable entities, not the subscribers,
decide what signals are carried). The FCC indirectly regulated the cable industry through its
licensing of microwave common carriers which serve as relay links between distant broadcast
stations and cable systems. In Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 32 F.C.C. 459
(1962), the FCC denied a microwave carrier's application to relay distant signals to cable
systems.
10. See In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, To Adopt Rules and Regulations To
Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations To
[Vol. 35:705
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Act implicitly authorized direct cable regulation and subsequently it im-
posed comprehensive regulations on all cable systems." In prescribing rules
governing cable operations, the FCC emphasized the necessity of imposing
restrictions on cable systems as a means of preventing the cable industry
from frustrating the achievement of statutory objectives for broadcasting.12
In 1968, the Supreme Court affirmed FCC jurisdiction over cable televi-
sion in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. '" The Court held that the
FCC was given broad responsibility to regulate all aspects of communica-
tion, including cable television, by virtue of the Communications Act.14 At
the same time, however, the Court limited FCC regulation of cable television
to that which is "reasotiably ancillary to the . . . performance of the Com-
mission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting."' 5
In its continuing concern for the protection of the broadcast industry, the
Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965), afl'd sub
nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968) (first FCC cable regulations
only imposed on cable operators that received microwave signals).
11. See In re Amendment of Subpart L., Part 91, To Adopt Rules and Regulations To
Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations To
Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966), aff'd sub
nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968). The FCC stated for the
first time that the statutory basis for its jurisdiction over cable was provided by § 2(a) of the
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 152(a), which empowered it to regulate "interstate commu-
nication by wire." 2 F.C.C.2d at 734. The FCC also derived its regulatory authority from
§ 307(b), which requires the FCC to distribute broadcast service in a "fair, efficient and equita-
ble" manner "among the several States and communities." 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1982).
12. Many independent UHF (ultra high frequency) stations were failing in the mid-
1960's, and the FCC concluded that the cable industry was hindering UHF prospects, 2
F.C.C.2d at 782.
Thus, the FCC imposed certain regulatory restrictions on cable operators. They included
the extension of the "must-carry" and distant signal nonduplication rules. Those restrictions,
formerly applicable only to microwave-fed cable systems, were then extended to all cable oper-
ations.
The FCC also established a burdensome rule requiring cable operators in the top 100 mar-
kets who wanted to import distant broadcast signals to demonstrate first in a hearing that such
signal importations "would be consistent with the public interest," and particularly the estab-
lishment and health and maintenance of UHF television broadcast service. 2 F.C.C.2d at 782.
The FCC allowed cable systems outside of the top 100 markets to carry local and distant
signals after a 30-day notice period, if no objections were filed at the FCC, 47 C.F.R.
§ 74.1105(c) (1970).
13. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
14. Id. at 181. The Supreme Court agreed with the FCC that § 2(a) of the Communica-
tions Act provided the FCC with cable jurisdiction, and that the regulation of cable was a
necessary and legitimate means of fostering the FCC's statutory objectives for the broadcast
industry. 392 U.S. at 172-74.
15. 392 U.S. at 178.
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FCC promulgated comprehensive cable regulations in 1972.16 In United
States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 17 the Supreme Court up-
held an FCC rule requiring cable television systems with 3,500 or more sub-
scribers to originate local programming and to distribute a significant
amount of programming that was not derived from broadcast television sta-
tions. 8 The Court in Midwest Video I vastly expanded the scope of FCC
cable jurisdiction without formally abandoning the "ancillary to broadcast-
ing" standard articulated in Southwestern. The former concept of FCC cable
authority had been limited to preventing harm to the broadcasting indus-
try. 19 It was now extended to include promoting broad statutory objectives
"to assure that in the retransmission of broadcast signals viewers are pro-
vided suitably diversified programming. "'2
The Supreme Court subsequently curtailed the expansive FCC authority
16. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (codified at 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.57, 76.59, 76.61 (1985)), afl'd sub nom. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523
F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975). These regulations included a new must-carry rule requiring cable
operators to carry the signals of all commercial television stations within 35 miles of the cable
community, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(a)(1), 76.61(a)(1) (1985); various other stations in the same
market, id. §§ 76.59(a)(2)-(5), 76.61(a)(2)-(4); and any other "significantly viewed" stations in
the cable community, id. §§ 76.57(a)(4), 76.59(a)(6), 76.61(a)(5).
17. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
18. Id. at 659-63. First Report and Order in Docket No. 18,397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969),
rev'd sub nom. Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406
U.S. 649 (1972). The "origination" rule was adopted in 1969 and provided that "no [cable]
system having 3,500 or more subscribers shall carry the signal of any television broadcast
station unless the system also operates to a significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting
and has available facilities for local production and presentation of programs other than auto-
mated services." 47 C.F.R. § 74.111 l(a) (1970). The rules defined "cablecasting" as "pro-
gramming distributed on a [cable] system which has been originated by the CATV operator or
by another entity, exclusive of broadcast signals carried on the system." 47 C.F.R.
§ 74.1101(j) (1970).
19. The establishment of the origination rules marked a significant change in the FCC's
view of the role of cable television. Cable television systems no longer were seen as single
retransmitters of broadcast television programming. The FCC recognized that cable could
"[increase] the number of local outlets for community self-expression and [augment] the pub-
lic's choice of programs and types of services, without use of the broadcast spectrum." Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 18,397, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 421
(1968).
The Southwestern Court also appeared to regard cable as a mere appendage to broadcasting
by describing cable systems as "perform[ing] either or both of two functions. First, they may
supplement broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations in adjacent areas
. . . and second, they may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant stations entirely be-
yond the range of local antennae." 392 U.S. at 163. The Supreme Court in Southwestern also
defined cable's future in relation to broadcasting by stating that "[cable television promises] for
the future to provide a national communications system, in which signals from selected broad-
casting centers would be transmitted to metropolitan areas throughout the country." Id. at
164.
20. Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. at 669.
[Vol. 35:705
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over cable television pronounced in Midwest Video I by its 1979 decision in
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video HI). 21 The Midwest Video HI
decision struck down the FCC's 1976 access rules imposing various require-
ments on cable television systems, one of which was to make available for
access by public, educational, and local government users certain channels,
termed "PEG" access channels. 2 The FCC argued that the access rules
were designed to promote the same objectives that were upheld as within its
jurisdiction in Midwest Video I, i.e., greater programming diversity and in-
creased outlets for self expression.23
The Court stressed that the access rules virtually deprive cable operators
of all discretion as to what may be transmitted on the PEG channels.24
Those rules, therefore, were rules unlike the program origination rules up-
held in Midwest Video I that did not abrogate the cable operator's control
over the composition of programming.25
The Court invalidated the access regulations because it found that they
imposed common carrier status on cable systems,26 and that the Communi-
cations Act barred the FCC from compelling broadcasters, including cable
operators, to act as common carriers.27 Although Midwest Video I de-
prived the FCC of some jurisdictional authority over cable television, the
Supreme Court subsequently broadened other aspects of the FCC's jurisdic-
tion over cable television.
In 1984, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down on federal preemp-
tion grounds, an Oklahoma ban on cable liquor advertising in Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,28 suggesting that the FCC could assert virtually un-
bounded authority over cable television. The respondent in the Crisp case
conceded that enforcement of the Oklahoma advertising ban conflicted with
both FCC regulations and federal copyright law,29 but argued that the
21. 440 U.S. 689 (1979), rev'g 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978).
22. 440 U.S. at 708-09; see also Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements, Report and
Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
23. 440 U.S. at 699.
24. Id. at 700-01.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 689, 701.
27. Id. at 706. Section 153(h) of the Communications Act provides that
..common carrier" . . . means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in
interstate or foreign communications by wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio
transmission of energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not sub-
ject to this chapter; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as
such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.
47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982).
28. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
29. Id. at 2700.
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Oklahoma statute should prevail in this conflict because of the state's broad
power under the twenty-first amendment to regulate intoxicating liquor.3 °
The Court agreed that the states enjoy broad regulatory powers under the
twenty-first amendment,3' but concluded that this power did not supersede
the FCC's regulatory authority.32
The Crisp Court's preemption analysis emphasized three major points: (1)
federal law can preempt state law in a variety of circumstances; 33 (2) federal
regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes;34 and (3) the
FCC clearly had authority to regulate cable television.35 The Crisp Court,
interpreting its earlier decision in Southwestern, found that the FCC has
comprehensive authority to regulate cable systems. 36 Further, the Court ex-
plained that the FCC's regulatory powers encompass all actions necessary to
ensure fulfillment of its statutory responsibilities.37 It reasoned that any
FCC determination to preempt an area of cable regulation and to accommo-
date any conflicting policies in a reasonable manner would preclude the en-
forcement of conflicting state regulations.38
Thus, the early cable regulatory environment left undefined the limits of
FCC jurisdictional authority over cable television. Early court decisions and
FCC administrative rulings represent a struggle between interpretations of
FCC cable authority that created a web of local and federal regulatory poli-
30. Id.
31. Id. The Court interpreted the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, to re-
quire federal preemption of state laws in the following situations: when there is clear congres-
sional intent to preempt; when Congress has comprehensively legislated in a certain area; when
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible; or when the state law hinders con-
gressional objectives. 104 S. Ct. at 2700.
32. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. at 2700-01.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2700 (citing Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141
(1982)).
35. Id. at 2700-01.
36. Id. at 2701 (citing United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-78
(1968)).
37. Id.
38. Id. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan stated, "[I]f the FCC has resolved to pre-
empt an area of cable television regulation and if this determination 'represents a reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies' that are within the agency's domain, we must conclude
that all conflicting state regulations have been precluded." 104 S. Ct. at 2701 (citation omit-
ted) (quoting United States v. Shimer, 267 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
In Crisp, the Court explained that the FCC's assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over the
signal carriage of cable systems was a determination to preempt state regulations that reason-
ably accommodated conflicting federal and state policies. 104 S. Ct. at 2708-09. Justice Bren-
nan found that the FCC's objective of ensuring diverse cable services and programming
through a uniform national policy would be undermined by state and local regulations that
interfered with the transmission of cable signals by operators pursuant to federal authority. Id.
[Vol. 35:705
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cies governing different facets of the cable television industry. The Supreme
Court ruling in Crisp confirmed the FCC's comprehensive regulatory au-
thority over cable television and indicated that federal jurisdiction would
prevail over conflicting local cable regulatory policies. Subsequent to Crisp,
however, the cable industry was to confront yet another regulatory measure
when Congress enacted a new federal cable law.
B. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984"9 represents the first ma-
jor revision of the Communications Act of 1934,4 and the first successful
legislative effort to create a national regulatory policy for cable television.
The Cable Act expressly provides the FCC with cable jurisdiction under the
Communications Act.41 Although the Cable Act provides the FCC with
central authority over cable, Congress recrafted a balance between local and
federal cable regulation.42 The Cable Act generally limits the power of state
and local governments to regulate cable operators, but permits some state
regulation that the FCC previously had preempted.43
This section will review various provisions of the new Cable Act that im-
pose new federal regulatory policies on cable operators dealing with com-
mercially leased access channels," protection of subscriber privacy, 45 equal
employment opportunity,46 and other provisions that will have a significant
effect on the industry such as rate regulation47 and franchise fees.48
1. Rate Regulation
In 1972, the FCC set minimum standards relating to the cable franchise
process, which included procedures for franchisee selection, construction
39. Cable Act, §§ 601-639 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (West Supp. 1985)).
40. Pub. L. No. 73-417, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934); see 130 CONG. REC. H10,435 (daily ed. Oct.
1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
41. Cable Act, § 601 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West Supp. 1985)).
42. The Cable Act represents a series of compromises that emerged from hearings, discus-
sions, and negotiations between members of Congress, and representatives of cities and the
cable industry. See 130 CoNG. REC. H10,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984).
43. Legislative history identifies local franchising authorities as the "primary means of
cable television regulation." H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 24 (1984) (local
authority is in best position to develop franchises tailored to community's needs). Cf Crisp,
104 S. Ct. at 2702 n.8 (FCC has comprehensive jurisdictional authority except over nonopera-
tional aspects of cable franchising).
44. Cable Act, § 612 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532 (West Supp. 1985)).
45. Id. § 631 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West Supp. 1985)).
46. Id. § 634 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West Supp. 1985)).
47. Id. § 623 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 543 (West Supp. 1985)).
48. Id. § 622 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 542 (West Supp. 1985)).
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timetables, fees, rate regulation, and processing subscriber complaints.49
The FCC eliminated these standards in 1976 and suggested they be used as
voluntary guidelines. 5' The only remaining federal franchise standard relat-
ing to rate regulation was the preemption of pay cable services rate regula-
tion." Prior to enactment of the Cable Act, local authorities could regulate
rates for basic cable service.52
The Cable Act provisions regarding rate regulation of cable services are a
compromise between local authorities, which wanted to regulate basic cable
service rates,53 and the cable industry, which believed the marketplace
should control rates.54
Under the new Cable Act, cable systems subject to "effective competition"
must be free of all local rate regulations beginning December 29, 1986."5
The FCC adopted a new rule section that defines "effective competition" as
the presence in the cable community of "at least three unduplicated televi-
sion signals.",5 6 These three signals include any television broadcast signal
49. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 141, 207-10, on reconsideration,
36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972), afJ'd sub nom. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344
(9th Cir. 1975).
50. For an example of franchise guidelines, see 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1984) (repealed by 50
Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,661 (1985)).
51. See In re Amendment of Subparts B and C of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules
Pertaining to Applications for Certificates of Compliance and Federal-State/Local Regulatory
Relationships, 66 F.C.C.2d 380, 401 n.21 (1977); see also In re Community Cable TV, Inc.
[hereinafter cited as Nevada I], 95 F.C.C.2d 1204, 1215-16 (1983) (FCC preemption of local
rate regulation of satellite-delivered programming), quoted in Crisp, 104 S. Ct. at 2702 n.9;
Clarification of Cable Television Rules, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, 199-200 (1974) (concluding there
should be no rate regulation of cable at any government level), afJ'd sub nom. Brookhaven
Cable TV v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
52. Basic service consists of service regularly provided to all cable subscribers. See Clarifi-
cation of Cable Television Rules, 46 F.C.C.2d at 199; Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, 209 (1972); see also Nevada 1, 95 F.C.C.2d at 1212-18 (local regulation for basic
cable service).
53. See Options for Cable Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 4103, H.R. 4229, and H.R. 4299
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1983) (statement of Charles Foyer,
president, National League of Cities) [hereinafter cited as Option Hearings].
54. Options Hearings, supra note 53, at 50 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler, president,
National Cable Television Association).
55. Cable Act, § 523 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 623 (West Supp. 1985)). Cable systems
operating under franchises granted on or before Dec. 29, 1984, are subject to rate regulation
until Dec. 29, 1986, whether or not they are in a community where they are subject to "effec-
tive competition." Such systems will be deregulated on Dec. 29, 1986, if they are in areas
subject to effective competition on that date. Cable systems will be subject to regulation after
Dec. 29, 1986, under the terms set out in the Cable Act, if they are in areas not subject to
effective competition on that date. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.33 (1985).
56. See Report and Order, In re Amendment of Parts 1, 63 and 76 of the Commission's
Rules To Implement Various Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 58
[Vol. 3 5:705
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that (1) places a predicted grade B contour over any portion of the cable
television community; 7 (2) is deemed "significantly viewed" within the
cable community;" or (3) is transmitted from a translator station located
within the cable community.59
The Cable Act provides a two-year grandfather period that allows local
authorities to regulate basic cable service pursuant to provisions in existing
franchise agreements.6 Thereafter, local authorities may not regulate rates
for any cable service if the cable system confronts effective competition in its
market. 6' During this two-year period, the Cable Act also permits cable
operators to increase basic service rates by five percent without local ap-
proval, 62 unless an existing franchise agreement provides that rates will be
frozen at a particular rate for a fixed period of time.63
RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Report and Order]. The Report and Order
adopts a new rule that defines effective competition. 47 C.F.R. § 76.33(a)(2) (1985).
57. The predicted grade B contour of a television signal is determined through a formula
contained in 47 C.F.R. § 73.683(a) (1985) and is based on signal strength expectations given
various factors such as station frequency, transmitter power, antenna height, and antenna gain.
See also 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(e) (1985).
58. Significantly viewed signals include those that are listed in the appendix to part 76 of
the FCC's rules governing cable television. The list, originally compiled in 1972, is organized
by state and county, and signals that are significantly viewed in a county are deemed by the
FCC to be significantly viewed within all communities in that county. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.53
(1985). Rule 76.54 also permits an individual determination to be made for "significantly
viewed" stations for television signals for specific cable communities. 47 C.F.R. § 76.54
(1985). This determination requires a precise survey of the viewership in noncable homes. Id.
The standards for "significantly viewed" stations are 3% share and 25% net weekly circula-
tion for a network station and 2% share and 5% net weekly circulation for an independent
television station. Id.
59. There is no power limitation specified in rule § 76.33, so presumably even a one-watt
translator could qualify. 47 C.F.R. § 76.33 (1985). The translator signal will not count if it
retransmits a signal, grade B contour or significantly viewed, already used in the three-signal
effective competition count. The Report and Order does not address low-power television, and
it is unclear whether those stations count toward the effective competition quota. Further-
more, a franchising authority, by following prescribed procedures in accordance with FCC
rule § 73.686, may rebut a determination that a signal counts toward the effective competition
signal quota. 47 C.F.R. § 73.686 (1985).
60. See Cable Act, § 623(c), (g) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(c), (g) (West Supp. 1985)).
61. The FCC has preempted local regulation of the rates for pay cable services such as
HBO. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984). The Cable Act maintains pay
cable deregulation by prohibiting any level of government from regulating rates not specifically
provided in § 623. Cable Act, § 623 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 543 (West Supp. 1985)). Pay
cable rates continue to be beyond municipal control under the Cable Act. H.R. REP. No. 934,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4661.
62. Under the Cable Act, a cable operator's request for a 5% increase will be considered
granted if the franchising authority fails to act on the request within 180 days. Cable Act,
§ 625 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(d) (West Supp. 1985)). The cable operator and franchis-
ing authority may agree to an extension of the 180-day period. Id.
63. Cable Act, § 623(e) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(e) (West Supp. 1985)). This provi-
19861
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2. Franchise Fees
The Cable Act eliminated all FCC authority to regulate the amount or use
of cable television franchise fees.64 Earlier FCC regulations limited
franchise fees to three percent of a cable system's gross revenues, or five
percent upon a showing of adequate need.65 The Cable Act increases the
amount of franchise fees collected to five percent of a cable system's gross




In 1979, the Supreme Court in Midwest Video 1168 overturned the FCC's
1976 access regulations that required cable operators to make public, educa-
tional, governmental (PEG), and commercially leased channels available for
sion permits cable operators to adjust for inflation without being subject to city approval. H.R.
REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4662. If the cable operator does not exercise its option to increase rates by 5% in a
particular year, it cannot carry the unused amount over to another year. Id. at 67. Further-
more, Congress did not intend the automatic increase to be a ceiling on rates. See id. at 67-68.
Thus, if franchising authorities agree that cable operators may increase rates automatically by
more than 5% per year, these provisions remain valid under the Cable Act.
64. Cable Act, § 622(h)(2)(i) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(h)(2)(i) (West Supp. 1985));
see also H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 64-65 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4663, 4701-02 (discussing franchise fee regulations and congres-
sional intent to deprive FCC of its franchise fee authority).
65. Franchise fees are the amount the cable operator pays annually to the local franchis-
ing authority. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1984) (repealed by 50 Fed. Reg. 28,661 (1985)); see also
In re City of Miami, 56 RAD. REG. (P & F) 458 (1984) (FCC invalidated local franchise rules
requiring cable operators to make extra payments totaling 11% of each operator's gross
revenues).
66. Cable Act, § 622(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(b) (West Supp. 1985)).
67. Id. § 622(g)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(g)(2) (West Supp. 1985)); see id.
§ 622(g)(2)(B) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(g)(2)(B)) (grandfathers existing franchise agree-
ments that require extra payments from cable operators to cover franchising costs and to sup-
port access facilities); id. § 622(g)(2)(B) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(g)(2)(B) (West Supp.
1985)) (franchise authority may collect capital costs that cable operator incurs to support pub-
lic access facilities even if in excess of 5% ceiling).
Section 622 of the Cable Act defines franchise fee only to include monetary payments made
by a cable operator or subscriber and excludes any franchise requirement for services, facilities,
or equipment. Therefore, payments for public access capital costs required in a new franchise
are not subject to franchise fee limitations. Id. § 622(g)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(g)(1)
(West Supp. 1985)). A franchising authority may establish requirements for such payments
under § 61 l(b) or § 624(b)(1) of the Cable Act. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 65 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4702 (cable operators
may make additional "voluntary" payments to provide financial support for public access
channels).
68. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
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use on a nondiscriminatory basis. 69 As a result of this decision, various
states enacted their own access requirements.7" Under the authority of
Crisp, the FCC preempted such locally imposed programming bans and
mandatory provision for access channels.7"
The Cable Act provides little or no opportunity for cable operators to
reduce existing PEG requirements.72 With respect to franchises and
franchise renewals granted after the Cable Act's effective date, the Cable Act
expressly allows franchising authorities to establish requirements for the
designation and use of PEG access channels.7 3 Under the Cable Act,
69. In overturning the FCC's public access regulations, the Court noted that the FCC
may have had jurisdiction to promulgate less intrusive access regulations. See id. at 705 n. 14.
See In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning
the Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section 76.251,
59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976); see also Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190
(1972), affid sub nom. American Civil Liberties Union, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975) (federal
cable requirements for access channels for public, educational, governmental (PEG) and leased
access programming for systems in the top 100 television markets). By requiring cable opera-
tors to provide PEG and leased access channels from their available channels, the FCC imple-
mented, in part, its policy of opening new outlets for local expression, promoting diversity in
television programming, restoring a sense of community to cable subscribers, aiding in the
functioning of democratic institutions, and improving informational and educational commu-
nications resources. Amendment of Part 76, 59 F.C.C.2d at 296.
70. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066.1 (West Supp. 1983 & 1986) (California does not
regulate rates of cable entities if certain criteria are met, one of which is the provision of public
access channels); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-333(c) (West Supp. 1985) (Connecticut requires at
least one noncommercial public access channel); see also Harrison, Access and Pay Cable
Rates: Off-Limits to Regulators After Midwest Video I1, 16 COLUM J.L. & SOC. PRoBs. 591,
619-30 (1981); Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (1983), vacated, 773 F.2d 382
(1st Cir. 1985) (where First Circuit upheld a state imposed requirement for mandatory cable
access channels).
71. See Crisp, 104 S. Ct. at 2700-03.
72. PEG channel requirements in existing franchises are given a uniquely protected status
in the Cable Act. Section 637 of the Cable Act effectively grandfathered all PEG equipment,
service, facilities, and funding commitments made by cable operators in existing franchises.
Cable Act, § 637 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 557 (West Supp. 1985)). Section 622(g) of the
Cable Act, excludes from the 5% franchise fee ceiling the cost to the cable operator of imple-
menting existing PEG commitments. Cable Act, § 622(g) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(g)
(West Supp. 1985)). Section 61 l(c) of the Act preserves the right of franchising authorities to
enforce "any requirement in any franchise" regarding provision or use of PEG channel capac-
ity. Cable Act, § 61 l(c) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 531(c) (West Supp. 1985)). Modification of
PEG commitments in existing franchises is strictly limited by the Cable Act. Section
625(a)(l)(A) restricts any modifications of PEG "facilities or equipment" unless the cable op-
erator can demonstrate that compliance would be "commercially impracticable." Cable Act,
§ 625(a)(1)(A) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 645(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1985)). Further, § 625(e)
states that the modification procedures under the Act are not available to a cable operator
seeking relief from requirements for "services" relating to PEG. Cable Act, § 625(e) (codified
at 47 U.S.C.A. § 645(e) (West Supp. 1985)).
73. Section 611 (b) expressly permits franchising authorities to issue requests for proposals
requiring that a specific number of channels be set aside for PEG use. Cable Act, § 61 l(b)
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franchising authorities also may permit unused PEG channels to be used for
other purposes. In addition, the Cable Act directs franchising authorities to
adopt new rules under which cable operators may program unused PEG
access channels.7 4 Although cable operators are expressly prohibited from
exercising editorial control over PEG channels,7 5 the Cable Act indemnifies
cable operators from liability for PEG channels' program content.76
b. Leased Access Channels
The Cable Act also requires cable systems with thirty-six or more "acti-
vated" 77 channels to designate a certain percentage of their channels for
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 531(b) (West Supp. 1985)). The only limitation is that new
franchise "funding" obligations imposed on the operator to support PEG access (other than
"capital costs") are to be considered a part of the franchise fee subject to the 5% ceiling. Cable
Act, § 622(g)(2)(C) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(g)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985)).
The franchising authority also may require that some channel capacity for PEG use be
designated on a system's "institutional network," which is defined as one that is generally
available only to nonresidential subscribers. There is no limitation upon the extent of channel
capacity that a franchising authority can require for PEG use on either the subscriber or insti-
tutional network. Cable Act, §§ 61 l(b), (f) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 53 1(b), (f) (West Supp.
1985)).
74. Section 611 (d) provides that the franchising authority shall establish:
1. rules and procedures under which the cable operator is permitted to use such
[PEG] channel capacity for the provision of other services if such channel capacity is
not being used for the purposes designated, and
2. rules and procedures under which such permitted use shall cease.
Cable Act, § 611(d) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 531(d) (West Supp. 1985)). The legislative
history expressly prohibits franchising authorities, when implementing their rules, from adding
any PEG requirements in excess of those contained in the existing franchise. H.R. REP. No.
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4684.
The House committee stated that franchising authorities would better serve their communities
by allowing cable operators to provide other cable services on the unused PEG channels,
rather than having those channels remain unused until PEG use increased. Id., reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4684.
75. Cable Act, § 61 1(e) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 531(e) (West Supp. 1985)). There is no
limitation imposed upon a franchising authority's or other governmental entity's editorial con-
trol over use of channels set aside for governmental purposes. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 47 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4684.
76. Cable Act, § 638 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West Supp. 1985)) (exempts cable
operators from liability for "libel, slander, obscenity, incitement, invasions of privacy, false or
misleading advertising, or other similar laws" for any program carried on any PEG channel).
77. In the Matter of Amendment of Parts 1, 63, and 76 of the Commission's Rules To
Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 58 RAD. REG. 2d
(P & F) 1 (1985). The Commission clarified the term "activated channel" to mean:
all channels used for the provision of video and other programming services gener-
ally available to subscribers, i.e., any channel used to provide cable service to sub-
scribers. In addition, those channels not carrying any programming but capable of
delivering cable service to subscribers without additional engineering modification of




lease to unaffiliated parties for commercial use.18 Programming in place on
a cable system on or before July 1, 1984, is grandfathered and need not be
displaced to make room for commercially leased access users.79 Cable oper-
ators are expressly authorized to establish the price, terms, and conditions
for leased access use, and must consider the nature of any proposed pro-
gramming for purposes of setting a reasonable price.8" The Cable Act also
permits cable operators to set conditions and prices to ensure that the leased
access use "will not adversely affect the operation, financial condition, or
market development of the cable system."8'  Any persons aggrieved by a
cable operator's failure or refusal to make leased access channels available or
offer access only on unreasonable terms may bring an action in the federal
district court in the district in which the cable system is located.8 2 As with
PEG channels, cable operators may not exercise editorial control over pro-
posed programming83 and have no liability for the transmission of obscene
or constitutionally unprotected matter on leased channels.84
78. Cable Act, § 612 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532 (West Supp. 1985)). Systems with 36-
to-54 activated channels must set aside 10% of "available channels" for leased access. Id.
Systems with 55-to-100 activated channels must set aside 15% of "available channels." Id.
Systems with more than 100 activated channels must set aside 15% of all channels. Id. In
determining the system's number of "activated channels," only those "engineered at the
headend" are counted. Id. Cable systems with fewer than 36 "activated channels" are exempt
from this provision but still must comply with any existing franchise requirements regarding
leased access channels. Id.
79. Cable Act, § 612(b)(l)(E) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532(b)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1985)).
80. Cable Act, § 612(c)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985)). The
House report makes clear that cable operators may take into account the effect of the leased
access programming on the marketing and the mix of its existing services, the potential market
fragmentation and the impact on subscriber and advertising revenues. H.R. REP. No. 934,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 4688.
81. Cable Act, § 612(c)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985)).
82. Cable Act, § 612(d) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532(d) (West Supp. 1985)). The Cable
Act specifically provides that the offer made by the cable operator is presumed to be reasonable
and that the burden is on the aggrieved party to prove otherwise by "clear and convincing
evidence." Id. The Cable Act gives the court the authority to review the obligations of the
cable system to determine whether the refusal to make channel capacity was lawful and to
review the negotiations to determine whether the price, terms and conditions offered by the
cable operators were unreasonable. Id. If the court agrees that the price, terms, and condi-
tions were unreasonable, it may set the price, terms, and conditions and may award damages,
if appropriate. Id.
83. Cable Act, § 612 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532 (West Supp. 1985)).
84. Cable Act, § 638 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West Supp. 1985)) (provides for
federal immunization of the cable operator from liability for any program carried on a leased
access channel under Cable Act, § 612 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532 (West Supp. 1985))).
See supra note 76.
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4. Subscriber Privacy
The Cable Act creates a nationwide standard for the protection of sub-
scriber privacy by regulating the collection, use, and disclosure by cable op-
erators of personally identifiable information regarding cable subscribers.85
All cable operators were required under the Cable Act to provide written
privacy rights notices to existing subscribers by June 23, 1985 and annually
thereafter.86 New cable subscribers must receive notice at the time they
enter into a contract or service agreement with the cable system.87
Under the Cable Act, cable operators cannot collect personally identifiable
information without the prior written or electronic consent of the sub-
scriber. 88 Exceptions are provided, however, where such information is nec-
essary to render service to the subscriber,89 or to detect unauthorized
reception of cable communications.9 ° Further, cable operators are prohib-
ited from disclosing personally identifiable information of subscribers unless
85. Cable Act, § 631 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West Supp. 1985)). "Personally
identifiable information" includes such personal subscriber information as names and ad-
dresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, and any other personal identifiers, codes,
or numbers. Aggregate information about subscribers that does not contain names, addresses,
or other personal identifiers, is not "personally identifiable information." H.R. REP. No. 934,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4716.
86. Cable Act, § 631 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West Supp. 1985)) (requires cable
operators to give notice to subscribers clearly and conspicuously setting out privacy rights).
87. Although the legislative history states that the privacy notice must be provided within
180 days of the time a subscriber begins to take cable service, the Cable Act requires notice to
be given to new subscribers "[a]t the time of entering into an agreement." Cable Act,
§ 631(a)(1)(E) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(a)(l)(E) (West Supp. 1985)). See H.R. REP. No.
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4714.
The privacy rights notice must contain the nature of the personally identifiable information
the cable operator collects, and for what purposes it will be used, Cable Act, § 631(a)(1)(A)
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1985)); the particulars of to whom and
when the information may be disclosed, id. § 631(a)(1)(B) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 551(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1985)); the length of time the cable operator will maintain the
information, id. § 631(a)(1)(C) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1985));
when and where the subscriber may access information pertaining to him or her, id.
§ 631(a)(1)(D) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(a)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1985)); limitations im-
posed on the cable operator to collect and disclose personally identifiable information, id.
§ 631(a)(l)(E) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(a)(l)(E) (West Supp. 1985)); and, that the sub-
scriber may enforce the Cable Act's limitations on collection and disclosure by civil suit, id.
88. Cable Act, § 631(b)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985)). Cable
systems that at one time collected personally identifiable information must now conform to the
Cable Act provision requiring subscriber consent before any such collection. Subscribers may
consent over the cable system itself (electronic consent), not merely by telephone. H.R. REP.
No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4715.
89. Cable Act, § 631(b)(2)(A) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(b)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1985)).
90. Cable Act, § 631(b)(2)(B) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985)).
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the cable subscriber consents, 9' the information is necessary to render a
cable service or conduct a legitimate business activity related to a cable ser-
vice, 92 or a cable operator receives a court order requiring him or her to
disclose personally identifiable information concerning a particular sub-
scriber or subscribers.9 3
The Cable Act also requires that each cable subscriber be given access to
all personally identifiable information pertaining to him or her that is main-
tained by the cable operator.94 Such subscriber information must be de-
stroyed when it no longer is necessary for the purpose for which it was
collected. 95 The privacy provisions of the Cable Act may be enforced by a
civil suit96 and cable operators sued under these provisions are subject to
substantial penalties.9 7
91. Cable Act, § 6 3 1(c)( 2 ) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985)).
Names and addresses of subscribers may be disclosed if the subscriber is given the opportunity
to limit or prohibit such disclosure, and the disclosure reveals neither the extent of viewing or
other use by the subscriber of a cable service nor the nature of any transaction made by the
subscriber over the cable system. Id. § 631(c)(2)(C)(ii) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 55 l(c)(2)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1985)). These privacy provisions are in addition to other state
privacy laws to which a cable operator may be subject. Id. § 631(0(3) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 551(0(3) (West Supp. 1985)).
92. Cable Act, § 631(c)(2)(A) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985)).
93. Cable Act, § 631(c)(2)(B) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985)).
The cable operator also must notify the subscriber that he or she is disclosing personally identi-
fiable information pursuant to a court order. Id. If the court order was obtained by a govern-
ment agency, the agency must comply with certain procedural requirements such as offering
clear and convincing evidence that the subscriber is reasonably suspected of engaging in crimi-
nal activity, and that the information sought would be material evidence in the case, and the
subscriber is afforded the opportunity to appear and contest disclosure. Id. § 631(h) (codified
at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(h) (West Supp. 1985)).
94. This information must be made available to the subscriber at a convenient place desig-
nated by the cable operator, and the subscriber must be given a reasonable opportunity to
change or correct any error in the information. Id. § 631(d) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(d)
(West Supp. 1985)).
95. Id. § 631(e) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(e) (West Supp. 1985)). This information
must be destroyed provided there are no pending requests for access to such information. Id.
96. The Cable Act allows any person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in violation
of the privacy provisions to sue the cable operator in the United States District Court. Id.
§ 631(0(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(0(1) (West Supp. 1985)). It is conceivable that suits
by persons other than cable subscribers, such as franchising authorities, may be brought under
the broad language of this provision. Id.
97. Id. § 631(0(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(0(2) (West Supp. 1985)). This provision
provides that penalties for violation may include liquidated damages of $100 per day for each
day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher. Id. Punitive damages, reasonable attorneys'
fees, and other reasonable litigation costs may also be imposed by the court. Id.
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5. Equal Employment Opportunity
The equal employment opportunity (EEO) provision of the Cable Act 9 8
codifies the FCC's prior policy9 9 prohibiting cable operators from discrimi-
nating in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or
sex, and expands the scope of this policy by covering age discrimination."
Prior to the Cable Act, FCC cable rules required all cable television opera-
tors to afford equal employment opportunity to all qualified persons.''
Cable operators were not allowed to discriminate against any persons in em-
ployment for the reasons stated previously except for age. In addition, each
cable operator was required to establish and file with the FCC an EEO pro-
gram that included specific practices designed to ensure equal opportunity in
employment. 0 2
The Cable Act broadens the scope of systems subject to the EEO provi-
sion by including satellite master antenna television systems (SMATVs).' °3
SMATVs serving less than fifty subscribers are not subject to the EEO re-
quirements. 0 4 SMATV operators are subject to the EEO provision regard-
less of whether the systems serve only commonly owned apartments on
private property.'0 5 If an SMATV system is operated by the owner of a
multiple-unit dwelling, the EEO requirements apply only to those employees
who are primarily engaged in cable communications. 6
The Cable Act requires each cable operator to establish a program to en-
sure equal employment opportunities.' 0 7 Moreover, the Act specifies that
98. Cable Act, § 634 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West Supp. 1985)).
99. 47 C.F.R. § 76.311, deleted by Report and Order, In re Amendment of Part 76 of the
Commission's Rules To Implement the Equal Employment Opportunity Provisions of the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 58 RAD. REG. 2d 1572, 1606 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as EEO Report and Order].
100. Cable Act, § 634(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(b) (West Supp. 1985)).
101. 47 C.F.R. § 76.311(a) deleted by EEO Report and Order, 58 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F)
1572, 1606 (1985)).
102. Id.
103. Cable Act, § 634(h)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(h)(1) (West Supp. 1985)). The
intent of the coverage provision is to endorse the FCC's practice of reviewing EEO compliance
by cable systems and other employment units with more than five employees only. See H.R.
REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4729.
104. Cable Act, § 634(h)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(h)(2) (West Supp. 1985)).
105. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4730.
106. Cable Act, § 634(h)(3) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(h)(3) (West Supp. 1985)).
107. This program must include "defining and monitoring managerial and supervisory per-
formance of equal employment opportunity goals; informing employees, employee organiza-
tions, and sources of qualified applicants of the entity's equal employment opportunity policy;
and monitoring the entity job structure and employment practices" to "eliminate prejudice
and discrimination and to insure equal opportunity" throughout the organization. See H.R.
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cable operators must file an annual statistical report with the FCC and the
Act also defines the contents of that report.' The FCC also must certify
annually °9 those cable systems that comply with the EEO provision and
periodically must investigate the employment practices of each cable system
to review and verify its compliance with the prescribed EEO standards.'1 0
The Cable Act also requires the FCC to promulgate rules to implement a
regulatory program to investigate EEO complaints and violations and to en-
force EEO protections."' In response to that mandate, the FCC amended
its formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding the exchange of informa-
tion and the disposition of discrimination complaints involving broadcast
licensees to include cable operators and multiple system operators. 1 2 Con-
gress intended that the FCC develop an MOU regarding cable television sys-
tems similar to one that currently exists for broadcast licensees." 3 The
former MOU provided that the FCC and EEOC share information regard-
ing the employment practices and policies of broadcast licensees." 4 In addi-
tion, the EEOC sent quarterly reports to the FCC regarding all
discrimination charges against broadcasters. This MOU established the di-
vision of responsibilities between the two agencies to process discrimination
complaints against broadcasters.
The FCC also amended section V of the MOU so that the FCC "will
confer, to the extent legally permitted, with the EEOC prior to Commission
action on nonrestricted EEO rulemaking proceedings." 15 This change per-
mits FCC staff to disclose nonrestricted rulemaking items to the EEOC,
such as notices of inquiry and certain reports and orders, prior to FCC ac-
tion on such items. The amended MOU attempts to develop "a more or-
derly exchange of information between the Commission and the EEOC and
permits a more effective federal policy in this area.""' 6
REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4724.
108. Cable Act, § 634(d)(3) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(d)(3) (West Supp. 1985)).
109. Id. § 634(e)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(e)(1) (West Supp. 1985)).
110. Id. § 634(e)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(e)(2) (West Supp. 1985)).
111. Id. § 634(d)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(d)(1) (West Supp. 1985)); see also EEO
Report and Order, 58 RAD. REG. 2d 1572 (1985).
112. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Communication Commission
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 70 F.C.C.2d 230 (1978); see also EEO
Report and Order, 58 RAD. REG. 2d at 1604-06.
113. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4729.
114. EEO Report and Order, 58 RAD. REG. at 1604.
115. Id. at 1605.
116. Id. at 1606.
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Both employees and applicants for employment who believe they are be-
ing discriminated against by a covered cable operator may file a complaint
with the FCC.' 1 7 Under the Cable Act, a party-in-interest to a formal cable
EEO complaint "shall be anyone, or group representing said person, residing
within the cable system's franchise areas" who alleges noncompliance and,
according to the Cable Act, "signs and swears to a written description of the
allegations.""' 8 The FCC will not process formal complaints that do not
meet these Cable Act requirements. The FCC will notify a complainant
whether certain matters alleged in an EEO complaint raise a prima facie
question of noncompliance with the statute or FCC rules.119 When a com-
plaint does raise a prima facie question of noncompliance, the FCC will for-
ward it to the cable entity for a response. 20 The FCC then will evaluate the
cable entity's response and determine what, if any, action is appropriate.
A covered cable operator who has "failed to meet or failed to make best
efforts to meet" the EEO requirements is subject to statutory penalties.' 2 ' A
cable operator is subject to a penalty of $200 a day, accruing for up to 180
days, prior to FCC notification to the cable operator of any EEO violations.
This penalty can accrue indefinitely after notification. 122 Further, this pen-
alty is added to any other penalty or remedy that may be available to the
FCC under this or other laws. 1
23
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS AFFECTING
THE CABLE INDUSTRY
A. First Amendment Implications of Cable Television Regulation
The summer of 1985 marked another significant change in the regulation
of cable television. In a landmark decision, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v.
117. Cable Act, § 634(g) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(g) (West Supp. 1985)).
118. EEO Report and Order, 58 RAD. REG. at 1605.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Cable Act, § 634(f)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(f)(2) (West Supp. 1985)). Mi-
crowave licenses held by cable operators also may be suspended until the FCC determines that
any failure to comply with EEO requirements is corrected. Id. Cable operators who know-
ingly make false statements or submit falsified documentation in connection with an applica-
tion for certification also violate the Cable Act and are subject to its proscribed penalties. Id.
Both the public and appropriate franchising authorities will be notified of any penalties im-
posed under the EEO provisions. Id. § 634(f)(4) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554()(4) (West
Supp. 1985)).
122. Id. The EEO provisions do not preclude the establishment of more stringent EEO
requirements by state or local franchising authorities. Id. § 634(i)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 554(i)(1) (West Supp. 1985)).
123. Id. § 634(f)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(f)(2) (West Supp. 1985)).
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FCC, 124 a precedent was established when the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit declared unconstitutional the
twenty-year-old FCC mandatory carriage or "must-carry' ' 2 s regulations.
Those rules, requiring cable operators to carry local broadcast signals as part
of their basic cable service, were held to violate the first amendment rights of
cable operators and programmers.
26
The Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutional validity of the
must-carry rules or of any other analogous FCC regulations affecting cable
television.' 27 The lower federal courts initially sustained regulations against
first amendment and due process challenges. 128 In recent years, however,
the courts have subjected FCC regulation of cable television to a far more
rigorous constitutional analysis and have established that cable operators en-
gage in conduct protected by the first amendment.129
Prior to the Quincy decision, which will be discussed in greater detail be-
low, various courts have grappled with the question of defining the first
amendment rights of cable television operators. The United States Court of
124. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed sub nom. National Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, No. 85-502, 54 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985).
125. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-76.61 (1985).
126. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1463.
127. In Southwestern, the Court explicitly disclaimed reaching any question concerning the
validity of the FCC's cable rules. 392 U.S. at 167. The plurality in Midwest I stated in a
footnote that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had correctly upheld
the validity of several cable regulations. 406 U.S. at 659 n.17. The reference makes clear,
however, that the plurality merely suggested that the Eighth Circuit had correctly held that
the particular rules at issue comported with the standards set out in Southwestern for testing
the reach of the FCC's jurisdiction. The Midwest H Court later acknowledged that the plural-
ity's footnote in Midwest I was "dicta." 440 U.S. at 697 n.7. Although the Midwest II Court
did not reach any constitutional questions implicated by the particular cable regulations before
it, it described those questions as "not frivolous." 440 U.S. at 709 n.19.
128. See, e.g., Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968) (cable
television indistinguishable from broadcast media for purposes of first amendment analysis);
Titusville Cable TV v. United States, 404 F.2d 1187, 1189-90 (3d Cir. 1968) (nonduplication
rule does not conflict with the dictates of the first amendment); Buckeye Cablevision v. FCC,
387 F.2d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (cable regulations restrain speech no more than reasonably
required to serve important interest of preserving local broadcasting); Carter Mountain Trans-
mission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (denial of a station license is not a denial
of free speech), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
129. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (first amend-
ment protection exists for cable television); Quincy, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Tele-
Communications of Key West v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1337-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(plaintiff alleging differential treatment of cable operators on military base stated a viable first
amendment cause of action); Midwest Video, 571 F.2d 1025, 1053 (8th Cir. 1978) ("govern-
ment control of business operations must be closely scrutinized when it affects communication
of information and ideas"); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-45 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(per curiam) (sustaining first amendment challenge that cable regulation is an incidental bur-
den on speech).
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Midwest Video H addressed first amend-
ment issues in dicta,1 30 concluding that in the context of public access re-
quirements, the first amendment rights of cable operators were analogous to
those of newspaper publishers.' 31 The court referred to cable as a "private
electronic 'publication,' "1 32 and reasoned that, in light of Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,'33 a cable operator could not be compelled to
provide access.
The Supreme Court in Tornillo struck down as unconstitutional a Florida
right-of-reply statute that granted political candidates the right to reply,
without charge, to editorial attacks printed in newspapers.' 34 The Tornillo
court determined that any governmental interference with the editorial con-
tent of a newspaper violates the first amendment.' 35 The Court acknowl-
edged that the dissemination of a broad range of views was an important
public interest.' 36 Although conceding the newspaper industry was highly
oligopolistic, 13 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, re-
fused to invoke a scarcity rationale to justify a right of access to newspa-
pers.138 The Court in Tornillo concluded that a government-imposed right
130. 571 F.2d at 1052-57.
131. Id. at 1056; see also Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46 (also analogized first amendment
rights of cable operators to those of the print media).
132. 571 F.2d at 1056.
133. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
134. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973) provided in relevant part:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for
nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with malfea-
sance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to
another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such can-
didate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspic-
uous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply,
provided such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to.
418 U.S. at 244 n.2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973)).
135. 418 U.S. at 256. The Tornillo Court relying on precedent, observed that the Court, in
its earlier decisions involving the first amendment rights of newspaper publishers, had ex-
pressed concern over the issue of government-enforced access. Id.
136. 418 U.S. at 249-50. The Tornillo Court stated that "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id. at 252 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
137. 418 U.S. at 249-50. The Tornillo Court observed that
[liocal monopoly in printed news raises serious questions.. .. What a local newspa-
per does not print about local affairs does not see general print at all. And, having
the power to take initiative in reporting and enunciation of opinions, it has extraordi-
nary power to set the atmosphere and determine the terms of local consideration of
public issues.
Id. at 250 n.15 (quoting B. BAGDIKIAN, THE INFORMATION MACHINES 127 (1971)).
138. 418 U.S. at 253-54.
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of access contradicts the "First Amendment guarantees of a free press"139 by
causing newspapers to avoid controversial issues in order to evade the stat-
ute's operation. 140
In Tornillo's shadow, the Midwest Video 11 court discussed the FCC's lim-
ited authority to infringe upon the first amendment interests of broadcast-
ers. 141 Indeed, Chief Judge Markey, writing for the court in Midwest Video
1, noted that had it been necessary to rule on the first amendment issue, he
would have found the FCC's cable access regulation unconstitutional.
42
In Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 14 the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island denied a cable operator's injunction based
on a challenge to the constitutionality of a state regulation requiring public
access to cable television. ' The Berkshire opinion disagreed with the prior
rulings of the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits that cable operators
are entitled to the same measure of first amendment protection as newspaper
publishers. 145 The court found that the government has a substantial inter-
est in regulating cable franchises in that regulation limits the disruption to
139. Id. at 258.
140. Id. at 257. This mandatory right of access "dampens the vigor and limits the variety
of public debate." Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279).
141. 571 F.2d 1025, 1053 (1978).
142. Id. at 1056.
143. 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983).
144. See Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, Division of Public Utilities and Carri-
ers, Rules Governing Community Antenna Television Systems, ch. 14 (Jan. 14, 1983). Section
14.1 (b) provides:
Every CATV system operator shall make available to all of its residential subscrib-
ers who receive all or any part of the total services offered on the system at least one
access channel in each of the categories in sub paragraphs (1), (2), (3) herein. The
remaining channels reserved for access purposes shall be apportioned and designated
in response to demonstrated community need.
Channels reserved for access purposes shall be designated as one of the following:
(1) Public: Public access channels shall be made available for use by members of
the general public on a first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory basis. The VHF
spectrum shall be used for at least one of these channels;
(2) Educational.- Educational access channels shall be made available for use by
local educational authorities and institutions (including, but not limited to, school
departments, colleges and universities but excluding commercial educational enter-
prises);
(3) Government: Government access channels shall be made available for use by
municipal and state government;
(4) Others: Other designations for access channels may include (but need not be
limited to) religious, cultural, ethnic heritage, and library access;
(5) Leased: Leased access channels shall be made available on a first-come, first-
served nondiscriminatory basis.
Id. at 979 n.3.
145. 571 F. Supp. at 985; see also supra note 131.
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public property caused by cable companies'4 6 and shields the cable operator
from competition as a natural monopoly.' 4 7
After differentiating cable television and newspapers, the Berkshire court
concluded that government regulation of cable operators' editorial control
was warranted, although such regulation would be constitutionally imper-
missible if imposed on newspaper publishers.'4 8 The court further noted
that historically cable television, unlike newspapers, has not been free of gov-
ernment control over either its program content or its operations.' 49
B. The FCC Cable "Must-Carry" Regulations Held Unconstitutional
The Quincy court consolidated two cases that addressed the constitution-
ality of the must-carry rules. 5o In 1979, Quincy Cable TV, Inc., then a 650-
subscriber cable system serving an area near Spokane, Washington, asked
the FCC for a waiver of the must carry regulations because the regulations
violated the system's first amendment rights.' 5 ' The cable firm explained
that its system offered only twelve channels and that it wanted to provide
subscribers with programs from the three network affiliates in Seattle.
Quincy stated that to comply with the must-carry rules, it would have to
transmit the three Spokane network affiliates' signals.152 In addition,
Quincy argued that if it were required to dedicate six channels to over-the-
air programming, there would not be enough channels left for the many
cable movie, entertainment, and sports services available.' Further, it ar-
146. 571 F. Supp. at 985. In order to provide cable service to subscribers, a cable operator
must either dig up streets to lay cable underground or string wire across telephone poles. Id.;
accord, Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th Cir. 1981)
("city needs control over number of times its citizens must bear inconvenience of having its
streets dug up and best times for it to occur"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
147. The Berkshire court concluded that the franchising system creates a "natural monop-
oly" for the cable operator because the high cost of constructing a cable system is generally
controlled by awarding a franchise to no more than one operator in a designated service area.
571 F. Supp. at 986. A natural monopoly is a condition that arises when the demand for a
particular product or service is so limited that it is possible for only one firm profitably to
produce or supply the entire demand. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF
LAW 139-45 (1972). Other courts have agreed that cable television possesses the characteris-
tics of a natural monopoly. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Products v. City of Indianapolis, 694
F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1379. But see
Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (cable
television not a natural monopoly), afjTd sub nom. Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of San-
dusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970).
148. 571 F. Supp. at 985.
149. Id. at 985; see, e.g., supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
150. 768 F.2d at 1438 n.5.





gued that residents could receive the Spokane stations over the air without
interference. I" 4 Quincy also filed the results of a poll of more than one hun-
dred subscribers, indicating that the subscribers preferred to receive the Se-
attle stations and the cable services, and not the local stations. 155 The FCC's
Cable Television Bureau twice denied Quincy's request and rejected its argu-
ment that the must-carry rules violated the first amendment.'5 6 Quincy then
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. While the case was pending, the cable system was expanded to
thirty-two channels and the court agreed to return the case to the FCC for
review in light of this change. 57 The FCC reaffirmed its earlier decision and
fined the cable company for failure to comply with the must-carry rules.'
58
Quincy again appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit.
In 1980, Turner Broadcasting Co. (TBS) asked the FCC to abolish the
must-carry rules alleging that they violate the first amendment rights of
cable programmers, cable operators, and the viewing public.' 59 TBS argued
that the basic premise underlying the rules, the preservation of community-
oriented broadcasting, was invalid. 1" TBS also claimed that its market was
reduced because local cable systems were required to devote a significant
number of channels to local over-the-air stations.1 61 When the FCC refused
to act on the request, TBS asked the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit to order the FCC to consider its petition. '62 At
the FCC's request, the court returned the case to the agency, which subse-
quently denied the petition.' 63 TBS returned to the District of Columbia
Circuit and its case was consolidated with that of Quincy Cable TV, Inc.
The appeals court in Quincy observed that cable television warrants a
standard of first amendment review distinct from that applied to broadcast-
ers. " The panel noted that broadcasters are subject to regulation which, if
154. Id. at 1446.
155. Id. at 1446-47.
156. See In re Quincy Cable TV, 89 F.C.C.2d 1128 (1982).
157. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 730 F.2d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
158. 89 F.C.C.2d 1128, 1138 (1982).
159. See Petition for Rulemaking To Delete the Cable "Must Carry" Rules, filed by Turner
Broadcasting, Inc., Oct. 15, 1980, Joint App. to No. 83-2050, at 5-17.
160. Id. at 6-11.
161. Id.
162. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 84-136, Apr. 6, 1984. On March 21,
1983, TBS filed a Petition for Expedited Consideration. When that petition received no re-
sponse from the FCC, TBS sought review in the court of appeals to compel the FCC to insti-
tute a rulemaking or at least to respond to its petition.
163. Id. at 3.
164. See Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1448-50 (discussion of scarcity rationale as applied to
broadcasters).
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applied to other media such as the conventional press, would violate the first
amendment.' 65 The court reasoned that the first amendment standard ap-
plied to broadcasters is not appropriately applied to cable systems because
the technology makes it possible to transmit far more signals than could be
broadcast over the air. 166
The court found that the must-carry rules favor certain classes of speech
(local broadcasters) over others, and bolster local broadcasters by giving
them a competitive advantage over cable programmers. 67 In addition, the
court agreed that if cable systems are substantially filled with mandatory
signals, cable programmers are denied access to the system and subscribers
are denied the right to receive information they wish.' 68 Thus, the Quincy
court concluded that the must-carry regulations merit treatment as an "inci-
dental" burden on speech and, accordingly, it applied the "important or sub-
stantial" governmental interest test announced by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien. 169 The O'Brien Court had held that although regu-
lations based on government disapproval of speech content are constitution-
ally prohibited, a regulation only incidentally restricting first amendment
freedoms will be sustained if it "furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest," and if the incidental restriction on first amendment liberties
"is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 170 In
Quincy, the court of appeals determined that the FCC provided no evidence
to support its purported substantial governmental interest claim that local
television would be destroyed if the must-carry rules were abolished.' 71 Ul-
timately the court found that the rules in their current form were " 'grossly'
over inclusive," because they "indiscriminately protect[ed] each and every
broadcaster regardless of the quantity of local service available in the com-
munity and irrespective of the number of local outlets already carried by the
cable operator."' 172
The Quincy court invited the FCC to redraft the must-carry rules in a
manner more sensitive to first amendment concerns. 173 At the same time,
165. Id. at 1450.
166. Id. The Court noted that in light of cable's virtually unlimited channel capacity, the
standard of first amendment review reserved for occupants of the physically scarce airwaves is
plainly inapplicable. Id.
167. Id. at 1451 (quoting Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 48).
168. Id. at 1451-52.
169. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
170. Id. at 377. Although O'Brien involved symbolic speech, the test has been applied to
pure speech regulations as well. See, e.g., Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 9.
171. 768 F.2d at 1440.
172. Id. at 1460, 1463.
173. Id. at 1463.
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the order requiring Quincy to transmit the local network affiliates' programs
in addition to the Seattle stations was vacated by the court and the TBS
petition was returned to the FCC. The court vacated the agency's ruling
that refused to initiate rulemaking proceedings because the must-carry rules
were constitutional.1 7
4
On August 2, 1985, over a strong dissenting opinion by Commissioner
Quello, 175 the FCC decided not to seek further review of the Quincy decision
or to attempt to redraft the must-carry rules to conform with first amend-
ment standards.' 76 After the filing of numerous petitions by broadcast inter-
ests 177 and prompting from several members of Congress, 71 the FCC issued
a Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice) 179 to in-
vestigate and examine certain proposals to redraft the must-carry regulations
to meet the constitutional test required by Quincy. The Commission cur-
rently is reviewing comments on this rulemaking.' 80 On February 28, 1986,
174. Id.
175. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Quello, FCC Mimeo 6197 (released Aug.
5, 1985).
176. See Public Notice, Commission Will Not Appeal Quincy Cable TV v. FCC (statement
of Chairman Fowler and Commissioners Dawson & Patrick, Aug. 2, 1985). The Commission
concluded:
At this point we cannot conceive of a new set of rules which would accomplish the
Commission's policy goals and would meet the constitutional test outlined in the
Quincy decision. Accordingly, we believe that the better course is to seek an equita-
ble realigning of free marketplace forces rather than another false equilibrium of in-
trusion on the rights of cable operators, broadcasters, and copyright holders.
Id.
177. On October 4, 1985, the FCC received a request for rulemaking filed by the Associa-
tion of Independent Television Stations, Inc. (INTV), and a joint request filed by the National
Associaton of Broadcasters (NAB), concerning cable carriage of television broadcast signals.
This joint request also included the following parties: Association of Maximum Service Tele-
casters, Station Representatives Association, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., CBS,
Inc., National Broadcasting Company, Inc., ABC Affiliates Association, Spanish International
Communications Corporation, Bahia de San Francisco Television Company, Seven Hills Tele-
vision Company, and National Religious Broadcasters.
On October 15, 1985, a proposal on this matter was filed by the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, the National Association of Public Television Stations, and the Public Broad-
casting Service (Public Broadcasters). See infra note 179.
178. See, e.g., Letter from Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate Telecommu-
nications Committee, to FCC Chairman Fowler (Sept. 13, 1985); see also Letter from FCC
Chairman Fowler to Senator Goldwater (Sept. 24, 1985).
179. Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (In the Matter of Amendment
Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Governing Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by
Cable Television Systems), F.C.C. 85-607, MM Docket No. 85-349 (released Nov. 18, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Notice of Inquiry].
180. Comments in this proceeding were due Jan. 29, 1986; reply comments were extended
to March 21, 1986. See Order Granting Request for Extension of Time To File Reply Com-
ments (In the Matter of Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Car-
riage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems), MM Docket 85-349
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three commercial television broadcast groups and the National Cable Televi-
sion Association reached a compromise on revised "must carry" rules.' 8 '
(released March 3, 1986). See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 179, at 2-3. In its request, INTV
proposes the adoption of a specific rule based on § I l1 of the Copyright Act, as follows:
Cable television carriage of television broadcast signals is permissable [sic], for pur-
poses of Section 11 (c) of Title 17 of the United States Code, if the cable system
carries, as part of the basic tier of cable service regularly provided to all subscribers
at the minimum charge, the entire signals of all local television broadcast stations
without discrimination or charge. A television broadcast station is "local" as to a
cable system if the cable system lies within the "local service area" of the television
station, as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 1l(f).
Section 111 (f) of the Copyright Act states in pertinent part:
The "local service area of a primary transmitter" in the case of a television broadcast
station, comprises the area in which such station is entitled to insist upon its signal
being retransmitted by a cable system pursuant to the rules, regulations, and authori-
zations of the Federal Communications Commission in effect on April 15, 1976
Notice of Inquiry, supra note 179, at 2.
The NAB does not offer a specific rule proposal but instead suggests various gen-
eral areas for consideration. The NAB states that the court opinion serves as a kind
of traffic report on pitfalls to be avoided for new rules. They suggest that new rules
would require on-channel carriage of local signals in their entirety, on the basic tier
and without charge to the station, subject to specific guidelines provided by the Court
decision. NAB indicates that under the Court's guidelines the Commission must
have an empirical, not merely intuitive, basis for rules. NAB believes that a Notice
of Proposed Rule Making would yield facts upon which the Commission could rely
in this matter. Finally, the NAB states that the new rules could be drawn more
narrowly and flexibly to accommodate the Court's concerns and afford cable pro-
grammers greater access to cable systems. For example, some of the areas suggested
by the NAB for consideration in any new rules include: varying cable channel capac-
ity, duplicative broadcast signals and the definition of local station.
Notice of Inquiry, supra note 179, at 2.
The Public Broadcasters, in their proposal, request that the Commission consider
a rule requiring cable systems to carry on their basic tier all public television stations
that provide Grade B service to the cable system's community. The petitioners be-
lieve that without mandatory carriage rules, the ability of local public television sta-
tions to reach significant portions of the audiences may be adversely affected and that
this will undermine Commission and Congressional policies designed to assure the
.. . widespread availability of diverse, quality public television programming. The
Public Broadcasters believe that such a rule proposal would meet the Court's consti-
tutional test.
Notice of Inquiry, supra note 179, at 3.
181. See Communications Daily, Vol. 6, No. 40, Feb. 28, 1986, at 1-4; see also Communica-
tion Daily, Vol. 6, No. 39, Feb. 27, 1986, at 1-2. Following is the full text of must-carry
agreement as of February 28, 1986:
A. Rational for a Modified Must Carry Rule
The Communications Act sets up two principal forms of television distribution:
free over-the-air broadcasting and subscription; closed transmission cable. Must
carry is necessary to protect the public interest in a reasonable quantum of free
television being available to the public.
B. Specifics of the Rule
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The FCC currently is considering the industry compromise.
1. Cable systems with 20 or fewer activated channels are exempt.
2. Cable systems with more than 20 activated channels must carry all quali-
fied local television stations. Such stations are defined as those which (a)
are located within 50 miles, as measured from the principal cable headend
to the reference point of the station's city of license and; (b) receive a 2%
share and 5% net weekly circulation in non-cable homes, by county.
(Qualified local stations which were classified as distant signals under the
old must carry rules do not have to be carried where copyright obligations
continue to require treatment as distant signals.)
3. New stations may, at any time after sign-on, demonstrate they meet the
2%/5% viewing standard by presenting survey evidence gathered by a rec-
ognized ratings service (e.g., Arbitron or Nielsen).
4. Must carry will only be accorded to primary full power television stations.
Translators, low power, and other passive signal repeaters do not have to
be carried.
5. Systems with 21 to 26 activated channels are not required to carry more
than 7 qualified local stations. Systems with more than 26 activated chan-
nels are not required to devote more than 25% of those channels to car-
riage of qualified local stations. "Activated channels" means those
channels engineered at the headend of the cable system for the provision of
services generally available to residential subscribers of the cable system,
less channels reserved against interference with aeronautical frequencies.
6. Where the number of qualified local stations exceeds the 7 or 25% caps,
the system selects the stations to be carried. No preferences exist in this
selection process for network affiliates or any other type of station.
7. Systems are not required to carry more than one qualified local network
affiliate station of the same commercial or public network. The system
makes the selection.
8. A system does not have to afford non-duplication protection where it
chooses to carry more than one station affiliated with the same commercial
or public network.
9. A system cannot charge for carriage of a non-distant signal which is cov-
ered by the compulsory license. Stations which qualified or would have
qualified for must carry under the old rules and no longer so qualify for
mandatory carriage are to have may carry status.
10. Systems are not required to carry signals contained in the vertical blanking
interval (VBI), e.g., teletext, or other primary signal enhancements, e.g.,
multi-channel sound.
11. Systems are not required to carry stations on their channel positions, but
must carry all qualified local stations in their entirety on lowest priced tier.
12. Must carry is conditioned upon delivery of a good signal by the broadcast
station to the cable headend. "Good signal" is to be defined by engineers.
(Editor's note: The following language on political considerations originally was
a part of the full agreement as Section C. It was taken out and will not be filed
with FCC. In addition, this language was not released publicly by parties to the
compromise.)
As a supplement to our letter of February 26, 1986, setting forth a proposed
rationale and must carry rule, we also propose the following political
undertakings:
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C. First Amendment Effect on Local Regulatory Jurisdiction over Cable
Television
Setting the stage for what could be another significant ruling on the first
amendment rights of cable operators, the Supreme Court recently granted
review to hear arguments on a lower court ruling that the first amendment
prohibits a city from awarding an exclusive cable television franchise to only
one cable company in a community. 182 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held in Preferred Communication, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles ' 83 that, under the first amendment, a city could not limit access to a
given part of the city to a single cable operator when public utility facilities
in that area are physically capable of accommodating more than one system.
Preferred Communications, Inc., was organized to operate a cable televi-
sion system in Los Angeles.' 84 Knowing that surplus space on public utility
poles had been reserved for use by cable television companies, Preferred
sought leases allowing it to install its cables on utility poles owned by the
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. and the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power. 8 The utilities refused to negotiate leases with Preferred
until it obtained a cable franchise from the city.'86
POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS
1. This agreement is not finalized until a majority of FCC Commis-
sioners and key Members of Congress have agreed to its specifics.
2. The undersigned organizations agree to withdraw their support
of the Frank, Bryant and Trible-Gorton bills dealing with the
compulsory license, will inform the sponsors of their position,
and will not seek other legislation to repeal the compulsory
license.
In addition, the undersigned organizations will not seek to stop or
amend a bill to which NCTA and MPAA may agree which would
replace the current distant signal rate schedule with a simplified "flat
fee" plan.
EDWARD 0. FRITTS MARGITA E. WHITE PRESTON PADDI
President Coordinator President
National Association Television Operators Association
of Broadcasters Caucus, Inc. Independent
;N
Television Stations
Communication Daily, vol. 6, no. 40, Feb. 28, 1986, at 3-4.
182. See Kamen, High Court Takes Cable TV Case, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1985, at A4, col.
1; Supreme Court To Hear Case Challenging Franchising on First Amendment Grounds, Mul-
tichannel News, vol. 6, no. 48, Nov. 18, 1985, at 1.
183. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
184. Id. at 1399-1400.
185. Id. at 1400.
186. Preferred was advised by Los Angeles officials that because it did not participate in the
cable franchise auction that had already been held, it had missed the opportunity to partici-
pate. The City of Los Angeles grants a monopoly franchise in each region of the city. Id. at
1401. To enter the auction, each bidder was required to pay a $10,000 filing fee and to promise
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On appeal, the Preferred Court determined that there were no technologi-
cal reasons for regulating cable operators in the way over-the-air broadcast-
ers are regulated'87 and the city's interest in protecting public resources did
not warrant the extreme regulation provided by the franchise selection auc-
tion process.188 The court concluded that because the public utility poles
could accommodate more than one set of cables, establishing monopoly
franchises amounted to reserving a public forum for only one speaker, which
violates the first amendment. 189
As with Preferred, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit also affirmed first amendment cable protections utilizing a
public forum analysis in Tele-Communications of Key West v. United
States. 190 In Key West, a cable operator had been denied a franchise renewal
by Homestead Air Force Base when the installation granted another
franchise to a new cable operator.' 9 ' Applying a similar public forum analy-
sis,' 9 2 the Key West court concluded that there was no reason the existing
cable franchise could not have been renewed simultaneously with issuing
another franchise to a new cable operator.1 93 At the same time, however,
the court warned that although the existing franchisee stated a first amend-
ment claim under public forum jurisprudence, it left open the possibility that
a different and perhaps more appropriate first amendment analysis may be
developed on remand. 1
9 4
to reimburse the city up to $60,000 for auction expenses. Id. at 1400. Each bidder also had to
pay a $500 "good faith" deposit as evidence of the promise. Id. The city also required, among
other things, that the franchise winner pay a percentage of annual gross revenues to the city
and set aside six mandatory access channels for use by the city, educational institutions, and
the general public. Id.
187. 754 F.2d at 1403, 1405.
188. Applying the O'Brien test, the Preferred court concluded that the auction might allow
the city to make selections based on the content of the cable company's programming and that
other means "less destructive of First Amendment rights" could be found to protect the city's
interest adequately. 754 F.2d at 1405-06.
189. 754 F.2d at 1408-11. The court stated that "although the public utility poles and
conduits are not public forums by tradition or designation, each may nevertheless serve as a
forum for expression via the cable medium." 754 F.2d at 1408.
190. 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
191. Id. at 1332-33.
192. The Key West court stated that the existing cable franchise had its first amendment
rights infringed if the right-of-way utilized was a public forum or if it was a nonforum. 757
F.2d at 1338. "If the property is a public forum, the government may restrict speech only to
serve significant (if content-neutral) or compelling (if not content-neutral) interests; if the
property is a nonforum, the government may restrict speech only if such restriction is reason-
able." Id. The court concluded that "an allegation that there were no reasons for restricting
speech" states a claim upon which relief could be granted under either analysis. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1339 & n.4. The court suggested that the public forum analysis, which assumes
that the medium of expression will not unduly burden the public rights-of-way, would be inap-
19861
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Thus, once again the courts have carved out some form of first amend-
ment protection for cable operators. The Supreme Court's ultimate decision
in Preferred could have far-reaching implications on the future of local cable
regulations and cable's access to public rights-of-way as a vehicle to further
freedom of expression under the first amendment.
D. FCC Preemption of State Regulations over Cable
Television Nonvideo Services
With the development of technology over the years, cable systems have
enhanced their capabilities to provide nonvideo services.' 95 The role of cable
in providing these services raises numerous questions concerning the FCC's
cable jurisdiction and preemptive authority. The new cable legislation does
not resolve these questions because the legislation intentionally "preserves
the regulatory and jurisdictional status quo with respect to non-cable com-
munications services."'
196
In a recent declaratory ruling requested by Cox Communications, Inc.
(Cox), the FCC preempted the Nebraska Public Service Commission's
(NPSC) prior certification requirements imposed on cable operators' provi-
sion of institutional transmission service.' 97 In its petition, Cox asked the
FCC to enter a declaratory ruling that the FCC has jurisdiction over and has
preempted state and local regulation of all facilities that are located wholly
within one state and used to originate or terminate interstate communica-
tions, including such facilities that also distribute intrastate communica-
tions.' 98 Cox specifically claimed that the NPSC regulations requiring Cox
to obtain a certificate of public convenience and to state the impact of its
services on Northwestern Bell Telephone Company and other telecommuni-
cations carriers had an adverse effect on its marketing and business develop-
ment.' 99 Cox urged the FCC to preempt such state regulation in order to
encourage the rapid development of new and innovative cable services.200
propriate if it were shown that two cable systems significantly disrupted the public rights-of-
way. Id.
195. Many cable systems constructed in recent years are capable of providing "two-way"
communications services, including the transmission of voice and data, e.g., shopping and
banking at home, burglar and fire alarm monitoring, video games, data retrieval, and the origi-
nation and termination of long distance voice and data retrieval.
196. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 934,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 29 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4666.
197. See Memorandum Opinion, Declaratory Ruling and Order, In re Cox Cable Commu-
nications, Inc., Commline, Inc. and Cox DTS, Inc., FCC 85-455, File No. CCB-DFD-83-1
(released Sept. 5, 1985) [hereinfter cited as Declaratory Order]; 50 Fed. Reg. 37,426 (1985).





The FCC ultimately ruled that "[a]ny state regulation of institutional
services offered by cable companies that acts as a de facto or de jure barrier
to entry into the interstate communications market . . . must be pre-
empted."' ' It reasoned that because Cox was originating and terminating
interstate common carrier service for entities such as MCI Telecommunica-
tions Corporation, the Nebraska regulations interfered with federal policies,
including those of encouraging traditional and alternative common carrier
services and ensuring the efficient use of facilities.2"2 The FCC further noted
that it encourages the use of cable facilities for services other than traditional
cable services, and, if it did not preempt the NPSC certification requirement,
Cox's transmission services might be impeded severely, if they developed at
all.2 ° 3
The FCC stated that preemption was specific to the Nebraska situation
where the cable system offered interstate service because "there may be in-
stances in which cable companies wish to provide only intrastate service or
in which a cable company's ability to provide intrastate service would have




Cable operators continue to seek federal preemption of state authority to
regulate cable's provision of data transmissions and other specialized serv-
ices. 20 5 Four Denver-area cable operators recently petitioned the FCC to
preempt certain Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) regulations
that the operators claim virtually foreclose cable provision of institutional
and nonvideo interstate services.20 6 Under current Colorado PUC rules,
cable systems must get a certificate of public convenience and necessity
before offering any intrastate service and can be denied such certificate if the
Mountain Bell Telephone Company has offered or has proposed to offer sim-
207ilar services.
This petition would expand the FCC's Cox ruling in that it specifically
seeks preemption of PUC rate regulation and tariff approval procedures
along with PUC regulations concerning any service capable of offering inter-
state service whether it provides it or not.20 8 Some commentators have sug-
201. Id. at 37,433.
202. Id. at 37,431-33.
203. Id. at 37,433.
204. Id.
205. See Pending Petition, In re Preemption of Colorado Regulation of Cable Television
Institutional and Non-Video Services, File No. CCB-DFD-85-35, filed Nov. 12, 1985; see also
FCC Asked to Preempt PUC Rules on Non- Video Services, Multichannel News, Nov. 18, 1985,
at 9 [hereinafter cited as Multichannel News].
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gested that the Cox and Colorado proceedings should be extended to
national preemption of all PUC rules governing cable provision of nonvideo
services.209
Both the new Cable Act210 and the Crisp2 1  decision may provide suffi-
cient ammunition to establish the FCC's jurisdictional authority to preempt
any state regulations that frustrate the development of cable television. The
resolution of this jurisdictional controversy undoubtedly will have a signifi-
cant impact on the future development of the cable television industry.
III. CONCLUSION
The evolution of the FCC's regulation of cable television has been incon-
sistent. The Commission initially concluded it would not regulate cable,
then subsequently moved to constrictive over-regulation. In recent years,
however, the FCC has been actively deregulating cable television. Mean-
while, the industry itself has progressed technologically and economically,
and cable has emerged as a strong communications medium. The FCC's
regulation has both influenced and been influenced by the continued emer-
gence of new technologies and services.
The recent Cable Act, at last, has embodied a national cable television
policy, providing guidelines for both federal and local regulatory authorities.
Such guidelines should lead to more consistent and predictable regulation.
Nevertheless, recent judicial decisions and administrative rulings suggest
that the evolution of cable television regulation is not yet ended. The courts
and the Commission can be expected to continue to strive to define the scope
of first amendment protections afforded to cable television. Local franchise
authorities can be expected to continue to assert their jurisdiction in areas
where the Cable Act has not fully resolved the question of who, if anyone,
has jurisdiction.
209. One commenter has noted that "[i]t's a lost game for cable if they try and play at the
PUC level because that's where the [Bell Operating Companies] live, that's their home." The
cable operators, he added, "[h]ave to have at the start of their businesses some regulatory room
to breathe in order to get their businesses going before they get slapped with a million-dollar
PUC approval proceeding." Multichannel News, supra note 205, at 9 (quoting cable attorney
Wes Heppler).
210. See Cable Act, § 601(4) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 521(4) (West Supp. 1985)). Section
601(4) provides that one of the Cable Act's purposes is to "assure that cable communications
provide and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and
services to the public." Id. This provision may be interpreted to empower the FCC to pre-
empt those state regulations that frustrate the achievement of the Cable Act's statutory goals.
211. 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984). The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in Crisp appear
to indicate that the FCC may preempt state regulation where it interferes with the provision of
increased and diversified cable services.
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